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ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE BINDING ON COMMERCIAL LEASE?

COMMERCIAL LEASES AND THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS

By Guest Authors: David P. Resnick and Seth Corthell

David P. Resnick,
RSP Shareholder

Most commercial leases are forged by a deliberate, organic process that includes face-to-face meetings, telephone calls and written correspondence between the landlord, the tenant and their respective agents, culminating in a written contract that historically was required to be signed by hand by both parties.  Over the past 20 years, the rise of email as a generally-accepted medium of business communication has prompted the law to allow certain contracts, including leases, to be entered into electronically, without a handwritten signature.  Progress has been made in this respect, both by statute and the common law; however, tweaking a centuries-old legal axiom takes time.  This article addresses recent developments and the present state of the law with respect to commercial leasing and electronic media.

 

The Historical Basics 

Under the law, all leases are contracts.  As such, leases require certain basic legal components to be enforceable.  Every contract must state definite terms and include a grant of consideration and mutuality of agreement and obligation between competent parties.  In order to be valid, contracts require offer and acceptance by the parties.

 

In addition, almost all leases are subject to the statute of frauds.  Patterned after an English statute enacted in 1677, the statute of frauds is the legal doctrine that certain contracts – including leases and other contracts affecting any interest in land – be contained in a written, signed instrument.  Certain exceptions commonly apply, notably to short term (i.e. less than one year) leases.  But prior to recent developments, the law was relatively straightforward:  Real estate contracts must be in writing to be enforceable.

 

The Culture Evolves

 

In light of this precedential legal backdrop, many questions arise from our increasing reliance on email in commercial leasing.  For instance, can an email or series of emails constitute a written lease?  Can an electronic signature on a lease bind a party in the same way as a handwritten signature?  Short of an ink-signed paper document, what might constitute a binding lease?

 

In 1999, in response to questions like these and calls for clarity on the use of electronic media for business transactions, the Uniform Law Commissioners promulgated the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA).  The UETA was the first effort to create a uniform set of laws with respect to electronic commerce, and 47 states have adopted it since its release.

 

Section 7 of the UETA contains the fundamental rules of the act:

  • A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
  • A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.
  • If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.
  • If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.

In short, the objective of the UETA is to establish that in the context of applicable transactions, electronic signatures are the equivalent of manual signatures and electronic records are the equivalent of hard copies.  A stated “paradigm” of the UETA is that it applies only to parties to transactions who have each acquiesced by some means to be bound electronically.  Moreover, under the UETA a party may always refuse to be bound by electronic correspondence.

 

Application

 

While case law is plentiful with respect to electronic communications and application of the UETA, the common law is still evolving as to the application of these topics in the context of  commercial leases and other real estate contracts.  A few notable cases highlight the complexities and pitfalls inherent in adjudging the enforceability of contracts without historically reliable handwritten signatures.

 

Though not ultimately related to a lease, St. Johns Holdings, LLC v. Two Electronics, No. 16 MISC 000090, 2016 WL 1460477 at *3 (Mass. L.C. April 14, 2016) is an example of a court’s willingness to expand its interpretation of the statute of frauds in the context of electronic communications.  In that case, the plaintiff, St. John’s Holdings (SJH) contacted the broker of defendant Two Electronics (T-E), first seeking to lease T-E’s property and later seeking to purchase the property instead.

 

Following a period in which the parties exchanged and negotiated draft purchase agreements through their respective agents, T-E’s broker sent a text message to SJH’s real estate agent stating that T-E wanted SJH to sign the purchase agreement first and provide the deposit check before T-E would finalize it.  At the end of the message, T-E’s broker (bearing authority for T-E) wrote his name.  The same day, SJH’s agent went to the office of T-E’s broker and delivered the check and the signed agreement.  Unbeknownst to SJH or its agent, T-E had a competing offer from a third party, and had accepted the other offer the same day it received the signed agreement from SJH.  T-E then refused to execute the agreement with SJH.

 

SJH subsequently brought an action for a declaratory judgment that the contract was executed, and for specific performance of the contract.  T-E moved to dismiss, arguing that SJH could not allege that T-E ever provided a signed writing compliant with the statute of frauds grounds.  SJH argued that the broker’s name at the bottom of the text message from T-E’s agent was sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.

 

The court ultimately agreed with SJH, finding that the text message in question, read in conjunction with the previous negotiation communications between the parties satisfied the requirements of the statute of frauds.  In coming to this conclusion, the court noted the evolution of business practices and the prevalence of electronic communications in business transactions.  The court analogized the broker’s name at the bottom of the text message to an electronic signature at the bottom of an email and deemed it sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds’ signature requirement.

 

Similarly, Crestwood Shops, LLC v. Hikene, 197 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006), demonstrates the significance courts will apply to email correspondence under the UETA in adjudicating the validity of contractual offer and acceptance.  In that case, tenant Hikene sought to lease larger retail space in a shopping center from the landlord, Crestwood Shops, LLC.  The parties entered into a five-year lease, but following commencement of the term, Hikene identified several problems with the new space, including mold on the premises, a defective HVAC system, and foundation issues.  As Hikene made preparations to renovate the new space, she brought the issues with the property to Crestwood’s attention.

 

Communications between Hikene and Crestwood became increasingly contentious, and both parties thereafter agreed to correspond in writing only.  Following her continued dissatisfaction with Crestwood’s response to the space issues, she stated in an email her desire to terminate the lease if the problems were not corrected by a date certain.  The next day, Crestwood responded that they accepted Hikene’s request to be released from the lease as of the stated date.

 

Hikene sought a declaratory judgment that the lease was not terminated, arguing that she did not agree to conduct her business transactions electronically and that she did not intend her email to be an offer to terminate the lease.  The court disagreed, ruling that the parties consented to the conduct of business through email, and that Hikene’s email constituted an offer to terminate that satisfied the statute of frauds.  In coming to its decision, the Court noted that the UETA instructs fact-finders to consider the “context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ conduct.”  Following this directive, the court determined that Hikene’s March 17 email insisting that the parties communicate through email demonstrated her willingness to transact business through email.

 

Clarity Is Key

 

As the legal regimes associated with electronic communications evolve, a variety of measures are available to parties to a lease in order to avoid being bound without intent.  For instance, landlords and tenants transacting electronically may ensure that a lease proposal or draft lease document is not exploited as an offer by including the following common language in each cover transmittal:  “Nothing herein shall be deemed or construed to be an offer by [sender], and [sender] shall not be bound unless and until such time as all parties have delivered fully-executed documents.”  And persons transmitting via email should always be aware that their electronic signature may be deemed to have the same legal effect as their handwritten signature.

 

As a general proposition, if a party wishes to confirm that it will not be bound by electronic correspondence, it is always wise to do so in writing.  The requirement in the UETA that a party must agree to conduct business electronically need not be established by an explicit statement; rather, it may be satisfied by an interpretation of context and conduct.  To be clear, parties to a lease are advised to reduce to writing their consent, or withdrawal of consent, to be bound in this manner.

 

Not long ago, commercial leases would take weeks to negotiate, draft and finalize.  Like virtually every other area of commerce, technology has streamlined the leasing process such that today, leasing transactions are completed with lightning speed.  Leasing professionals should be mindful of the hazards of doing business electronically and should consider the legal consequences of every email.

 

David P. Resnick is a member of the Board of Editors of the Commercial Leasing Law & Strategy newsletter.  He is a Shareholder at Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd. in Chicago, concentrating his practice in commercial real estate development and finance.  Seth Corthell is an attorney based in Chicago, Illinois.

 

Reprinted with permission from the May 2017 edition of the Commercial Leasing Law & Strategy ©2017 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-257-3382 or reprints@alm.com.

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COMMERCIAL LANDLORD-TENANT: Duty to Repair – Illinois Law

When something breaks in a commercial space, who is obligated to make the repair?

 

R. Kymn Harp Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

R. Kymn Harp
Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

Catherine Cooke Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

Catherine Cooke
Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

Absent a covenant in a lease obligating the landlord to make repairs, a landlord generally has no obligation to repair the leased premises, unless the landlord has actual knowledge of a defect at the time of entering into the lease and fraudulently conceals it. Baxter v. Illinois Police Federation, 63 Ill.App.3d 819, 380 N.E.2d 832, 835, 20 Ill.Dec. 623 (1st Dist. 1978); Elizondo v. Perez, 42 Ill.App.3d 313, 356 N.E.2d 112, 113, 1 Ill.Dec. 112 (1st Dist. 1976).

 

 

It is clear, however, that when a lease provides express covenants assigning responsibilities between landlord and tenant for repair and maintenance of leased property, those covenants will supersede any implied or common-law covenants and shall determine the responsibilities and liability of the respective parties. McGann v. Murray, 75 Ill.App.3d 697, 393 N.E.2d 1339, 1342, 31 Ill.Dec. 32 (3d Dist. 1979); Hardy v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 131 Ill.App.2d 1038, 267 N.E.2d 748, 751 (5th Dist. 1971). An express covenant to repair will not be enlarged by construction. Kaufman v. Shoe Corporation of America, 24 Ill.App.2d 431, 164 N.E.2d 617, 620 (3d Dist. 1960). The ordinary meaning of the word “repair” is to fix, mend, or put together that which is torn or broken. It involves the idea of something preexisting that has been affected by decay. Sandelman v. Buckeye Realty, Inc., 216 Ill.App.3d 226, 576 N.E.2d 1038, 1040, 160 Ill.Dec. 84 (1st Dist. 1991).

 

A general covenant of a tenant to keep the premises in repair merely binds the tenant to make only ordinary repairs reasonably required to keep the premises in good condition. Quincy Mall, Inc. v. Kerasotes Showplace Theatres, LLC, 388 Ill.App.3d 820, 903 N.E.2d 887, 230, 328 Ill.Dec. 227 (4th Dist. 2009); Sandelman, supra, 576 N.E.2d at 1040. It does not make the tenant responsible for making structural repairs. Kaufman, supra, 164 N.E.2d at 620; Expert Corp. v LaSalle National Bank, 145 Ill.App.3d 665, 496 N.E.2d 3, 5, 99 Ill.Dec. 657 (1st Dist. 1986); Mandelke v. International House of Pancakes, Inc., 131 Ill.App.3d 1076, 477 N.E.2d 9, 12, 87 Ill.Dec. 408 (1st Dist. 1985).

 

Alterations or additions of a structural or substantial nature that are made necessary by extraordinary or unforeseen future events not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of lease execution are ordinarily the responsibility of the landlord. Expert Corp., supra, 496 N.E.2d at 5. Likewise, renewals or replacements that would last a lifetime rather than maintain the condition of the premises are extraordinary repairs outside the scope of a tenant’s obligations under a general covenant of repair. Sandelman, supra, 576 N.E.2d at 1040; Schultz Bros. v. Osram Sylvania Products, Inc., No. 10 C 2995, 2011 WL 4585237 at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 30, 2011). When a deficiency is so substantial and unforeseen that it would be unreasonable to expect the tenant to make repairs that basically benefit not the tenant but the landlord, those repairs may be deemed structural. Baxter, supra, 380 N.E.2d at 835.

 

In order to shift to the tenant the responsibility to make structural or extraordinary repairs to the leased premises, a lease must (more…)

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COMMERCIAL LANDLORD-TENANT – Part 2 – The Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

R. Kymn Harp Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

R. Kymn Harp
Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

Catherine Cook Shareholder at Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

Catherine A. Cooke
 Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

This is Part 2 of a multi-part series of articles discussing the duties, rights and remedies of commercial real estate tenants in Illinois. Part 1, entitled “Getting It Right” discussed the importance of clarity in lease drafting, and the potential for unintended leasehold easements for parking, and other uses.

In March 2015, the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education (“IICLE”) published its 2015 Edition practice handbook entitled: Commercial Landlord-Tenant Practice. To provide best-practice guidance to all Illinois attorneys, IICLE recruits experienced attorneys with relevant knowledge to write each handbook chapter. For the 2015 Edition, IICLE asked R. Kymn Harp and Catherine A. Cooke to write the chapter entitled Tenant’s Duties, Rights and Remedies. We were, of course, pleased to oblige. Although each of us represent commercial landlords at least as often as we represent commercial tenants, a clear understanding of the duties, rights and remedies of commercial real estate tenants is critical when representing either side of the commercial lease transaction.

The following is an excerpt (slightly edited) from our chapter in the 2015 Edition. We hope you find this excerpt, and the excerpts that will follow, informative and useful. Feel free to contact IICLE  directly to purchase the entire volume.

The COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT
What Is It? — General Principles

It has long been the law in Illinois that a covenant of quite enjoyment is implied in all lease agreements. Blue Cross Ass’n v. 666 N. Lake Shore Drive Associates, 100 Ill.App.3d 647, 427 N.E.2d 270, 273, 56 Ill.Dec. 290 (1st Dist. 1981); 64 East Walton, Inc. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 69 Ill.App.3d 635, 387 N.E.2d 751, 755, 25 Ill.Dec. 875 (1st Dist. 1979); Berrington v. Casey, 78 Ill. 317, 319 (1875); Wade v. Halligan, 16 Ill. 507, 511 (1855).

A covenant of quiet enjoyment “promises that the tenant shall enjoy the possession of the premises in peace and without disturbance.” [Emphasis in original.] Checkers, Simon & Rosner v. Lurie Co., No. 87 C 5405, 1987 WL 18930 at *3 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 20, 1987). This does not mean, however, that no breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment may be found in a leasehold without a finding that the lessor intended to deprive the lessee of possession. Blue Cross Ass’n, supra, 427 N.E.2d at 27. It simply means that a tenant must actually be in possession of the premises to claim a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. If the tenant has already vacated the premises before the disturbance has commenced, no breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment occurs. Checkers, Simon & Rosner, supra, 1987 WL 18930 at *3.

RSP_LogoHD (3)An implied covenant of quiet enjoyment includes, “absent a lease clause to the contrary, the right to be free of the lessors’ intentional interference with full enjoyment and use of the leased premises.” Infinity Broadcasting Corporation of Illinois v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, No. 86 C 4207, 1987 WL 6624 at *5 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1987), aff’d, 869 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1989), quoting American Dairy Queen Corp. v. Brown-Port Co., 621 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir. 1980).

If the landlord breaches the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the lessee may remain in possession and claim damages for breach of lease. In such case, the measure of damages is the difference between the rental value of the premises in light of the breached covenant of quiet enjoyment and the rent that the tenant agreed to pay under the lease, together with such special damages as may have been directly and necessarily incurred by the tenant in consequence of the landlord’s wrongful act. 64 East Walton, supra, 387 N.E.2d at 755.

Although Illinois cases defining the precise scope of a covenant of quiet enjoyment are rare, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, pp. 1248 – 1249 (6th ed. 1993) defines “quiet enjoyment” in connection with the landlord-tenant relationship as “the tenant’s right to freedom from serious interferences with his or her tenancy. Manzaro v. McCann, 401 Mass. 880, 519 N.E.2d 1337, 1341. (Ringing for more than one day of smoke alarms in an apartment building could be sufficient interference with the tenants’ quite enjoyment of leased premises to justify relief against the landlord.).”

HOW THE COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT MAY APPLY— CASE LAW

In Blue Cross Ass’n v. 666 N. Lake Shore Drive Associates, 100 Ill.App.3d 647, 427 N.E.2d 270, 273, 56 Ill.Dec. 290 (1st Dist. 1981), the First District Appellate Court discussed the covenant of quiet enjoyment in the lease as granting the tenant a right of quiet and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the whole premises and equated a breach of quiet enjoyment under a lease to a private nuisance. “A private nuisance in a leasehold situation is ‘an individual wrong arising from an unreasonable, unwarranted or unlawful use of one’s property producing such material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt that the law will presume a consequent damage.’ ” Id., quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. LaSalle National Bank, 77 Ill.App.3d 478, 395 N.E.2d 1193, 1198, 32 Ill.Dec. 812 (1st Dist. 1979).

The tenant had entered into a five-year lease on August 22, 1978, with a five-year renewal option, for approximately 53,000 square feet of the (more…)

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Commercial Landlord-Tenant Issues – PART 1 – Getting it Right

R. Kymn Harp Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

R. Kymn Harp
Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

Catherine Cook Shareholder at Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

Catherine Cooke
 Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.

In March 2015, the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education (“IICLE”) published its 2015 Edition practice handbook entitled:  Commercial Landlord-Tenant Practice. To provide best-practice guidance to all Illinois attorneys, IICLE recruits experienced attorneys with relevant knowledge to write each handbook chapter. For the current edition, IICLE asked R. Kymn Harp and Catherine Cooke of Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, to write the chapter entitled Tenant’s Duties, Rights and Remedies. We were, of course, pleased to oblige. Although each of us represent commercial landlords at least as often as we represent commercial tenants, a clear understanding of the duties, rights and remedies of commercial real estate tenants is critical when representing either side of the commercial lease transaction.

The following is an excerpt (slightly edited) from our chapter, Tenant’s Duties, Rights and Remedies appearing in the 2015 Edition of IICLE Commercial Landlord-Tenant Practice. We hope you find this excerpt, and the excerpts that will follow, informative and useful. Feel free to contact IICLE directly to purchase the entire volume.

How Commercial Lease Issues Commonly Arise – Getting it Right

Commercial real estate leases, like virtually all documents and agreements relating to commercial real estate transactions and interests, are, to a very large extent, consistent only in their variety. In commercial real estate practice, there are few, if any, “standard form” documents or agreements. To be sure, there are provisions in commercial real estate leases that any experienced practitioner would expect to see, and there are some generally applicable legal concepts that apply, but the variety of issues that may arise — and the language used in each commercial lease — will directly and materially impact the “duties, rights, and remedies” of a tenant under any commercial lease.

The best answer to most questions about what are the rights, duties, and remedies of a tenant under a commercial real estate lease is “It depends.” What does it depend on? It depends primarily on what the parties to the lease — the landlord and tenant — intended, as (presumably) reflected by the express terms and conditions of the lease. However, two common challenges frequently exist, and they apply equally to commercial tenants and commercial landlords. They are (a) poorly written lease provisions that do not clearly and definitively set forth the intention of the landlord and tenant in a way that cannot reasonably be misunderstood and (b) inclusion of perceived “standard boilerplate” provisions in a lease without fully understanding their legal or practical affect on the leased premises, the parties, and the greater project of which the leased premises may be a part. When the intent of the parties is not abundantly clear, a court may find the answer implied by the facts and circumstances.

GENERAL LEASE PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

A “lease” is generally described as a contract for exclusive possession of land and improvements for a term of years or other duration, usually for a specified rent or other compensation. Urban Investment & Development Co. v. Maurice L. Rothschild & Co., 25 Ill.App.3d 546, 323 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1st Dist. 1975); Feeley v. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 141 Ill.App.3d 187, 490 N.E.2d 15, 18, 141 Ill.Dec. 187 (1st Dist. 1986).

In determining the duties, rights, and remedies of a tenant under a commercial lease in Illinois, the general rules of contract construction will apply. Walgreen Co. v. American National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago, 4 Ill.App.3d 549, 281 N.E.2d 462, 465 (1st Dist. 1972); Feeley, supra, 490 N.E.2d at 18; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Southland Corp., 111 Ill.App.3d 67, 443 N.E.2d 294, 297, 66 Ill.Dec. 611 (1st Dist. 1982). Interpretation of a lease is a question of law when the terms are plain and unambiguous. Madigan Bros. v. Melrose Shopping Center Co., 123 Ill.App.3d 851, 463 N.E.2d 824, 828, 79 Ill.Dec. 270 (1st Dist. 1984).

“An ambiguous contract is one capable of being understood in more senses than one; an agreement obscure in meaning, through indefiniteness of expression, or having a double meaning.” Advertising Checking Bureau, Inc. v. Canal-Randolph Associates, 101 Ill.App.3d 140, 427 N.E.2d 1039, 1042, 56 Ill.Dec. 634 (1st Dist. 1991), quoting First National Bank of Chicago v. Victor Comptometer Corp., 123 Ill.App.2d 335, 260 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1st Dist. 1970). However, the mere fact that the parties to a lease “dispute” the meaning of a lease provision and assign conflicting interpretations does not render the provision “ambiguous.” McGann v. Murry, 75 Ill.App.3d 697, 393 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 – 1343, 31 Ill.Dec. 32 (3d Dist. 1979); St. George Chicago, Inc. v. George J. Murges & Associates, Ltd., 296 Ill.App.3d 285, 695 N.E.2d 503, 506 – 507, 230 Ill.Dec. 1013 (1st Dist. 1998); Ford v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 273 Ill.App.3d 240, 651 N.E.2d 751, 745 – 755, 209 Ill.Dec. 573 (1st Dist. 1995). Whether ambiguity exists is a question of law for the court. Advertising Checking Bureau, supra, 427 N.E.2d at 1042; Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 91 Ill.App.3d 573, 414 N.E.2d 1152, 1154, 47 Ill.Dec. 36 (1st Dist. 1980).

It is well-settled in Illinois that, when construing a written lease, the court must give words their commonly accepted meaning and must construe every part with reference to all other portions of the lease “so that every part may stand, if possible, and no part of it, either in words or sentences, shall be regarded as superfluous or void if it can be prevented.” Kokenes v. Cities Service Oil Co., 24 Ill.App.3d 483, 321 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1st Dist. 1974), quoting Szulerecki v. Oppenheimer, 283 Ill. 525, 119 N.E. 643, 646 (1918). See also Southland, supra, 443 N.E.2d at 297.

In construing a lease, the instrument is to be considered as a whole and the primary object is to derive the intent of the parties. However, a contract must be enforced as written, and when the terms of a lease are clear and unambiguous, they will be given their natural and ordinary meaning. Gerardi v. Vaal, 169 Ill.App.3d 818, 523 N.E.2d 1327, 1331, 120 Ill.Dec. 416 (3d Dist. 1988).

The foregoing sounds pretty straightforward, but unless attorneys and their clients draft leases with a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between particularly drafted provisions and every other part of the lease — including so-called “standard boilerplate” provisions — they may find themselves surprised by what they have “agreed to.”

PRACTICE POINTER

 Drafting a commercial real estate lease is similar to drafting any other commercial document, except that the meaning and intent of contractual lease provisions are colored by an extensive body of underlying real property law that has developed over the centuries.

A commercial real estate lease should say what the parties mean and mean what it says. Words have meaning; phrases have meaning; each provision has meaning. The interplay of words, phrases, and all provisions in a lease will help determine the meaning of each other word, phrase, or provision. See Kokenes, supra, 321 N.E.2d at 340; Szulerecki, supra, 119 N.E. at 646.

PRACTICE POINTER

 Be sure the words and phrases you use mean what your client believes they mean before proceeding.

 If there are provisions of a commercial real estate lease you do not fully understand — including provisions you believe are “standard boilerplate” provisions — you need to learn what they mean and how they affect other parts of the lease, and your client’s rights, duties and remedies, before advising your client to proceed.

The following discussion highlights some areas in which the rights, duties, and remedies of the commercial real estate tenant (and, by mirror image, the landlord) appear not to have been what one or the other party thought they were. (more…)

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